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This is not my first rodeo; I have written about ripeness in 
land use takings cases before.1  After all this time and analysis, I am 
left with this primal question: WHY?  For decades, the reports of the 
decisions of federal district and circuit courts have been overflowing 
with opinions that laid waste to countless forests so they could dis-
cuss the reasons why they were not going to reach the merits of the 
 
 Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, and co-chair of the firm’s Appellate Practice Group.  
The author has spent the last forty-five years practicing takings law (both direct and inverse).  
He has argued four regulatory taking cases in the United States Supreme Court (on the prop-
erty owners’ side) and has filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the property owners in virtu-
ally all of the other significant Supreme Court cases during that period. 
1 Michael M. Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39 
(1985); Michael M. Berger, “Ripeness” Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling 
Leading Ninth Circuit Decisions is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 
(1988); Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes 
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW. 735, 786-95 (1988); Michael M. 
Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative for Property Owners Which Avoids Some of the 
Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional ‘Takings’ Litigation, 12 ZONING & PLAN. L. 
REP. 121 (May 1989); Michael M. Berger & Daniel R. Mandelker, A Plea to Allow the Fed-
eral Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 
(Jan. 1990); Michael M. Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How 
the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, 
& EMINENT DOMAIN (1991); Michael M. Berger, Regulatory Takings Under the Fifth 
Amendment: A Constitutional Primer, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 13-19 (1994); Michael M. Ber-
ger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View From the Trenches–A Re-
sponse to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837 (1998); Mi-
chael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99 (2000); Michael M. Berger, Property Rights and Takings Law: 
Y2K and Beyond, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN (2002) [hereinafter Property 
Rights & Takings]; Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There 
from Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches 
the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671 (2004); Michael M. Berger, What Has San Remo 
Done to the Ripeness Doctrine?, INST. ON PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN (2006). 
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particular property rights case then at issue.  After prodding and pok-
ing, like so many highly educated fruit peddlers, the courts decided 
that the cases were simply not “ripe” enough for them to deal with.  
How much ink and paper could have been saved—and perhaps some 
justice done in the process—if the courts had simply decided the is-
sues in the cases before them? 
As practiced in land use cases, the ripeness rule was nonsense 
when first articulated2 and it remains nonsense today.  One might 
have been willing to cut the Supreme Court some slack in the early 
days of regulatory taking litigation (i.e., the late 1970s and early 
1980s, when land use taking issues began to appear in court with 
some regularity), as the Court was candid about its inability to deter-
mine any bright line rules in a legal field that it had essentially aban-
doned for half a century (i.e., since the decision in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon).3  In the Court’s 1978 words: 
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite 
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” 
for determining when “justice and fairness” require 
that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain 
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.  In-
deed, we have frequently observed that whether a par-
ticular restriction will be rendered invalid by the gov-
ernment’s failure to pay for any losses proximately 
caused by it depends largely “upon the particular cir-
cumstances [in that] case.”4 
 
2 Actually, it was not “first articulated” at the outset of the series of Supreme Court opin-
ions we now categorize as dealing with “ripeness.”  Rather, after ducking the substantive 
issue (of what it takes to cause a regulatory taking) each time it came before the Court for 
nearly a decade, it finally dawned on people that what had developed (by the repeated dis-
missal of cases accepted for review as not having been ready for prime time) was an ad hoc 
rule for determining whether a regulatory taking case was ripe enough for litigation.  See in-
fra text accompanying notes 17-27. 
3 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  There were no Supreme 
Court inverse condemnation cases between then and 1978. 
4 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (alteration in 
 
2
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss2/7
2014] THE RIPENESS GAME 299 
The Court was still floundering when, in 1985, it articulated 
what has become the backbone of the ripeness rule in federal takings 
litigation:  A case is not ripe for federal court takings litigation until 
the property owner has “obtained a final decision” of what use will be 
permitted of the owner’s land and has exhausted (unsuccessfully) any 
avenue of compensatory relief afforded under state law.5  Thus, the 
Williamson County rule was born.6  It would not be until 1987, when 
the Court decided the famous “trilogy” of Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, and 
First English v. County of Los Angeles7 that the Court began to get a 
handle on substantive regulatory takings law.8 
But much has happened since 1978, and even since 1987.  
The slate is no longer clean, and the Court is no longer a stranger to 
takings cases.  Indeed, the Court’s most recent Term showed that the 
Justices now seem able to deal with some of the basic substantive is-
sues of takings law, sometimes unanimously.9  Moreover, in 2005, 
four Justices of the Supreme Court went on record as saying that the 
Williamson County rule was in serious need of re-evaluation and, 
perhaps, should be discarded.10  The author of that concurring opin-
ion (Chief Justice Rehnquist) confessed that he might have been mis-
taken in joining the Williamson County majority.11  Three others (Jus-
tices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) signed the Chief’s 
concurring opinion.12  Both lower courts and scholarly commentators 
 
original) (citations omitted). 
5 Williamson Cnty. Reg’l. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 
(1985). 
6 Id. 
7 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); First English Evangelical Luther-
an Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). 
8 A contemporaneous discussion of the holdings in those seminal cases is in Berger, Hap-
py Birthday, Constitution, supra note 1, at 743-55.  The author briefed and argued First Eng-
lish and filed an amicus curiae brief in Nollan. 
9 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012); Horne v. Unit-
ed States Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2056 (2013); Koontz v. St. John’s River Water 
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013); Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735 
(2013). 
10 San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 348-52 (2005) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
11 Id. at 348-49. 
12 Id. at 348.  The continuing validity of Williamson County had not been raised by the 
owner’s counsel.  Indeed, at oral argument Justice O’Connor directly asked whether he had 
challenged Williamson County.  When he replied in the negative, she responded, “Maybe 
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have seemed to engage in a contest to invent expletives to use in de-
scribing Williamson County.13  Unfortunately, although the Court has 
had the issue of Williamson County’s continued legitimacy presented 
in a number of petitions for certiorari since 2005, the Court has 
granted none.14  Nor, of course, has it indicated why—following a 
concurring opinion that seemed like an open invitation to the bar to 
present the issue for determination15—it has chosen to remain aloof 
from the fray. 
I’ve said it before.  Indeed, in boldly setting out a takings 
agenda for the Court during the Y2K frenzy of prognostications and 
hysterical warnings of impending doom, I strongly urged the Court to 
“develop a clear, understandable, workable ‘ripeness’ rule.  Better 
yet, allow property owners to sue directly in federal court to redress 
violations of federal constitutional rights.”16  It is time.  For those 
property owners who have lost substantial interests in property be-
cause of the ripeness game that has left them either playing the role 
of shuttlecock in some jurisprudential badminton game batting them 
between state and federal courts,17 or simply because they became 
 
you should have.”  Various of the supporting amicus briefs did so (including one written by 
the author of this article), but the Court acted as though the legitimacy of Williamson County 
was not involved, as it had not been raised by a party.  Later in oral argument, in a colloquy 
with the city’s lawyer, Justice O’Connor noted that “frankly, it isn’t clear to me that the 
Court ever contemplated just cutting off any determination in Federal court of takings claims 
in the way that it seems to work out by application of Williamson County.” 
13 Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 702-03.  The opprobrious descriptions 
of the Williamson County rule ran a gamut from “unpleasant,” “unfortunate,” and “unclear,” 
through “nonsense,” “draconian,” and “Kafkaesque.”  Id. at 702-04. 
14 See, e.g., Rockstead v. City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 947 (2007); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 473 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. de-
nied, 552 U.S. 813 (2007); Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2006), 
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 886 (2006); Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake, 415 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1004 (2006); SFW Arecibo, Ltd. v. Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 135 
(1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1075 (2005). 
15 The bar certainly views opinions like this—whether concurring in an opinion on the 
merits, as here, or concurring in or dissenting from the denial of certiorari—as at least broad 
hints from the Court (or some segment of it) about issues that ought to be presented for deci-
sion.  See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, What You Can Learn from Opinions Regarding the Denial of 
Certiorari, SCOTUS BLOG (Nov. 18, 2013, 2:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/201 
3/11/what-you-can-learn-from-opinions-regarding-the-denial-of-certiorari/; Christopher M. 
Mason, SCOTUS Cert Skirt Left Door Open for Cy Pres Tune-Up, LAW 360: A LEXISNEXIS 
COMPANY (Nov. 8, 2013, 6:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/487709/scotus-cert-
skirt-left-door-open-for-cy-pres-tune-up.  
16 Berger, Property Rights & Takings, supra note 1, at 3. 
17 See, e.g., Agri-Dade, Ltd. v. Metro. Dade Co., 605 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992); Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 195 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999); Agripost, LLC 
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exhausted and gave up, it is long past time. 
This much should be clear: No other constitutional claimant is 
made to run a litigational gauntlet like the one established for proper-
ty owners.  Not one.18  Federal constitutional issues can, and should, 
be litigated in federal court.  While there may be reasons why indi-
vidual cases are set aside, there is no rule that operates across the 
board as it does in property takings cases.  Nor is there a principled 
reason for treating citizens who own property differently from other 
citizens when all claims are that a government agency violated con-
stitutional rights. 
In recent years, there have been some hopeful signs (in addi-
tion to the inexplicably ignored concurring opinion in San Remo Ho-
tel, L.P. v. City of San Franscisco),
19
 primarily the recognition by 
some courts that the ripeness doctrine is prudential, not jurisdictional, 
so that federal courts may hear these cases if they so choose.  But, (1) 
that is not a mandatory rule, and in consequence, (2) it is not univer-
sally followed. 
In short, it is time for the Supreme Court to act decisively to 
eliminate this carbuncle on the body of the law. 
II. A QUICK SUMMARY OF THE WILLIAMSON COUNTY RULES 
To make sure we are all playing on the same page, here is a 
quick summary of the ripeness rules after Williamson County.  The 
rules have two prongs, finality and compensation.  Each prong has 
several branches. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Development of “Finality” 
The test was not officially recognized as requiring “finality” 
until after a number of its branches had sprung forth.  In hindsight, 
however, this appears to be what the Supreme Court was up to, and 
we have—to date—recognized five different branches of the “finali-




v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 525 F.3d 1049 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1151 (2009). 
18 Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 676. 
19 545 U.S. 323 (2005). 
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Branch 1: The property owner must apply for a 
specific use.20 
 
No application for use was made in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
21
 
one of the first modern-era takings cases to reach the Supreme 
Court.22  The parties stipulated that, if an application had been made, 
it would have been denied.23  Not enough for the Court.  Some com-
mentators have speculated that this was because Agins was an early 
case (after a half century layoff from property cases), but later cases 
demonstrate that it has taken a long time for the Court to begin to 
grasp the realities of the land planning process. 
 
Branch 2: The property owner apparently must make 
more than one application (or, at least, not apply only 
for the maximum use permitted under the zoning ordi-
nance); in other words, a “meaningful application” for 
use is required.24 
 
Only one application was made in each of the cases cited in 
the margin.25  There is troublesome language in MacDonald, Sommer 
& Frates v. Yolo County
26
 about the property owner’s plans being 
“exceedingly grandiose,” thus necessitating an application for some 
use, presumably, less “grandiose.”27  The problem for property own-
ers in trying to understand and work within the system is that the ap-
plication in that case was precisely what the general plan and zoning 
called for.28  The result is typical in California and in some other ju-
risdictions as well.  But, does it comport with either common sense or 
rational law?  Even after spending prodigious sums and enormous ef-
fort to draft general (California’s word for comprehensive) plans and 
zoning ordinances, planning agencies rarely approve development 
 
20 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
21 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
22 Id. at 260. 
23 Id. 
24 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 104-05; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477 U.S. 
340, 352 n.8 (1986). 
25 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 117-19; MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 347. 
26 477 U.S. 340 (1986). 
27 MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9. 
28 Id. at 347. 
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proposals that seek to develop land precisely in accordance with the 
applicable planning and zoning.  They always demand something 
less.  Application of this branch of the finality ripeness rule reinforces 
that predilection.  The Del Monte Dunes
29
 litigation, that took years 
to conclude and had to go all the way to the United States Supreme 
Court for finality, is a paradigm.30  There, the 37.6-acre rectangular, 
undeveloped parcel bordering the Pacific Ocean in Monterey had, for 
many years, been planned and zoned for multi-family housing at a 
density of twenty-nine units per acre.31  I’ll do the math for you: That 
comes to more than 1000 homes for the property.  That level of de-
velopment was in keeping with the commercial and multi-family de-
velopment bordering the parcel.32  The developer would certainly 
have been within his rights to propose a 1000-unit condo develop-
ment.  But he didn’t.  He sought only 344 single family detached 
homes.33  And the planners turned him down because—at one-third 
the density of the official plan—it was deemed too dense.34  They 
told him to submit a revised plan for 264 units.35  They turned that 
one down and suggested 224.36  Then 190.37  Nothing passed muster.  
That’s when the courts got involved. 
Here’s the planning essence:  What’s the point of comprehen-
sive plans and zoning ordinances if landowners and developers can-
not rely on them as at least rough guides of what they will be allowed 
to do?  Planning and zoning is not cheap, it is not easy, and (at least 
in California) it is not done overnight.  Enabling legislation requires 
intensive analysis involving housing, traffic, geology, the environ-
ment, and more, along with multiple public hearings for public in-
put—often by planning commissions as well as governing bodies.  




29 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
30 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 693, 695 
(1999). 
31 Id. at 694, 695. 
32 Id. at 695. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 695-96. 
35 Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695-96. 
36 Id. at 696. 
37 Id. 
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Branch 3: The property owner must apply for a var-
iance.38 
 
Although the idea of seeking a variance seems hard to dispute 
in the abstract, it can cause problems in particular cases.  In William-
son County itself, for example, the Court was suggesting the use of 
the variance procedure (essentially a device to resolve minor size and 
configuration problems) to deal with a 736 home, 676-acre subdivi-
sion in bulk.39  Some lower courts have taken the Supreme Court lit-
erally, and held that a “variance” must be sought even if one is not 
legally available according to local law.40  Perhaps this was just an 
early indication of the Court’s lack of understanding of the process, 
and it used the word “variance” in the vernacular sense of simply ask-
ing that the rules be changed to fit the planned project.41 
 
Branch 4: The property owner must obtain a “fi-
nal” determination of what the government will per-
mit.42 
 
This idea obviously caused a little bit of confusion within the 
Court, because the opinion contains a somewhat lengthy discussion to 
the effect that the “finality” requirement is not an exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies requirement, even though the concepts sound 
awfully similar.43  What is supposedly needed is a “final” determina-
tion of what the regulator will allow the property owner to do on his 
land.44  As any planner knows, however, that is not the job of either a 
 
38 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 200. 
39 Id. at 177, 188. 
40 See, e.g., Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 
1988); Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 841 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 
1988). 
41 See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The 
term ‘variance’ is not definitive or talismanic; if other types of permits or actions are availa-
ble and could provide similar relief, they must be sought.”). 
42 Id. at 502. 
43 Id. at 503 n.4. 
44 Of course, if comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances could actually be taken at face 
value as showing what could be developed on specific property, then this idea of getting a 
“final” decision from planners about what could be developed might make some modicum of 
sense.  But that is not our system.  Berger & Kanner, Shell Game, supra note 1, at 676; 
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
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municipal planning or zoning ordinance or of a professional planner.  
The planner’s job is to draw an abstract plan for all or part of a mu-
nicipality and then (after it is adopted by the governing body) deter-
mine whether a specific proposal meets all the requirements.  Anyone 
who thinks that he can get a planning agency to tell him what he 
CAN do on his land has probably been abusing some controlled sub-
stance—or doesn’t understand the planning process. 
 
Branch 5: The property owner must actually be in-
jured by application of the regulation.45 
 
The idea of suffering actual injury as a predicate to an action 
seeking compensation is hardly new to the law.46  In Supreme Court 
parlance, there would be no case or controversy.47  However, as is of-
ten the case, the devil is in the details.  What, for example, constitutes 
an “actual injury?”  If a property owner is prevented from using land, 
that non-use is certainly felt as injury by the owner.  Courts, however, 
have sometimes dismissed such concerns as simply the normal im-
pact of the planning process.  Or consider property owners who are 
prevented from changing the use of property that has become eco-
nomically unproductive.  The Supreme Court’s earliest pronounce-
ment showed little understanding: 
[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any 
way with the present uses of the Terminal.  Its desig-
nation as a landmark not only permits but contem-
plates that appellants may continue to use the property 
precisely as it has been used for the past 65 years . . . .48 
B. The “Compensation” Prong 
Branch 1: If compensation is available in state 
court it must be sought before resort can be had to 
 
45 See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-97 
(1981); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 493; Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988). 
46 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (citing Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
47 Id. 
48 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added). 
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federal court.49 
 
Branch 2: The property owner must seek compensa-
tion before seeking to invalidate the regulation.50 
III. THE UPSHOT IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Lower courts have been understandably confused.  I had one 
Ninth Circuit Judge ask me during oral argument whether I did not 
think it obvious that the Supreme Court did not want any regulatory 
taking cases in federal court?51  I had an Eighth Circuit Judge ask 
why we were bothering with his court at all, rather than simply ap-
pealing directly to the Supreme Court, which is the only court that 
could resolve the mess.52 
Part of the problem has been the refusal of some lower courts 
to simply read the language of Williamson County, rather than trying 
to read the minds of the Justices.  The Court’s analytical section be-
gins with the announced “conclu[sion] that respondent’s claim is 
premature.”53  Please note that the word chosen was “premature,” not 
“moribund.”54  Prematurity necessarily means that something is yet to 
be done to make the matter mature, or jurisdictionally “ripe.”55  The 
Williamson County opinion then goes on to say that, because of the 
lack of both a final administrative decision and the absence of an at-
tempt to seek compensation in state court, “respondent’s claim is not 
ripe.”56  Please note again that the phrase chosen was “not ripe,” ra-
ther than “dead.”  Absence of ripeness necessarily means that things 
need to—and can—be done to make the matter ripe.57 
 
 
49 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
50 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); contra Rossco Hold-
ings, Inc. v. State, 260 Cal. Rptr. 736, 743-44 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that in California, 
invalidation must be sought before compensation). 
51 See Hayward Exch., Inc. v. City of Oakland, 69 F.3d 544 (9th Cir. 1995). 
52 See Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2003). 
53 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 185. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 186. 
56 Id. 
57 See Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 1, at 102, 104-05 (discussing with 
greater detail what more can be done in order to ripen the matter). 
10
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ENGENDERED BOTH HOPE AND 
CONFUSION 
There is good news and bad news from the Supreme Court.  
We’ll start with the bad news. 
A. Procedurally, the Supreme Court has Multiplied 
the Confusion 
Procedural problems exist because, as noted earlier, the Su-
preme Court’s ripeness doctrine was not developed by the Court as a 
unitary doctrine vel non.  Rather, it simply grew on its own as the 
Court lurched through the late 1970s and early 1980s, granting certio-
rari in regulatory takings cases and then concluding that it could not 
(for one reason or another) reach the merits.58  Some of us believe 
that it was merely a case of the Court always having four votes to 
grant certiorari, but never being able to get a group of five to coalesce 
around a result.  Hence, the series of decisions that ducked making 
decisions.  What we were left with was the inadvertently developed 
ripeness rule. 
What scholars and practitioners alike believed we had as of 
1985 (when Williamson County was decided) was a rule that required 
property owners to seek relief under state law (presumably in state 
court), if relief were theoretically available there, and then lose in that 
attempt before darkening the doorway of a federal courthouse.59  
Property owners and their advocates believed this to be an unfair rule, 
but at least it was a clearly stated unfair rule.60 
That regime lasted until 1997, with decision of the City of 
Chicago v. International College of Surgeons case.61  That was a re-
moval case.  As a reminder of first year Civil Procedure class, when a 
case is brought in state court that could have been brought in federal 
court, the defendant has the right to remove the matter to federal 
 
58 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131; Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 199; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 
304. 
59 Some cases in this era were able to be filed immediately in federal court because there 
was not even theoretical relief available in state court.  See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 
at 699 (stating that compensation is not available in California). 
60 Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch, supra note 1, at 134. 
61 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
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court.62  Long story short, the City of Chicago placed historic preser-
vation restrictions on property owned by the Surgeons.63  The Sur-
geons sued in state court.64  Preferring the confines of the local feder-
al court, the City removed the case.65  The case reached the Supreme 
Court on the question of whether removal was appropriate.66  The 
Court held that it was, on the stunning ground that “ ‘[A] facial chal-
lenge to an allegedly unconstitutional . . . zoning ordinance’ is a 
claim ‘which we would assuredly not require to be brought in state 
courts.’ ”67 
The Court evidently overlooked Williamson County, under 
which any such claim brought in federal court would swiftly have 
been dismissed.68  Strangely, no party who filed a brief in the College 
of Surgeons case cited either Williamson County or its ripeness rule.69  
Thus, the confluence of Williamson County and College of Surgeons 
led to a rule that a property owner could not file suit in federal court 
over a takings claim, but the defendant municipality could remove it 
there.70  A one way option.  Anarchy rather than law. 
But all has not been bleak.  There has been some more helpful 
procedural commentary from the Supreme Court.  In addition to the 
San Remo concurrence’s suggestion that Williamson County may 
have been “mistaken,” the Court has expressed the view that Wil-
liamson County ripeness is a “prudential” rule rather than a “jurisdic-
tional” one.71  This is a critical happening.  It reinforces the plain 
words of Williamson County about federal litigation being premature 
(rather than barred), and it allows flexibility to lower courts to con-
sider the merits of serious cases brought before them, rather than 
 
62 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988). 
63 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 159-60. 
64 Id. at 160. 
65 Id. at 161. 
66 Id. at 163. 
67 Id. at 168 (alteration in original) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of 
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989)). 
68 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194-95. 
69 See Brief for Petitioner, City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) 
(No. 96-910); Brief for Respondent on the Merits, City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 
522 U.S. 156 (1997) (No. 96-910). 
70 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163; Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 194. 
71 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062; 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 729 
(2010). 
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spending their time on procedural web spinning of little moment.  
Moreover, in response to those lower courts’ concluding that federal 
claims could not be brought in state court, the lead opinion in San 
Remo rejected the idea, saying that Williamson County “does not pre-
clude state courts from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff’s request 
for compensation under state law and the claim that, in the alterna-
tive, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth Amendment 
of the Federal Constitution.”72 
Some lower courts are joining this trend.  The Fourth Circuit 
recently decided two cases in somewhat different procedural pos-
tures, but ended up allowing federal litigation to proceed.  In Sansotta 
v. Town of Nags Head,73 suit was filed in state court and then re-
moved by the defendant to federal court.74  When the town then 
sought dismissal from the federal court for lack of ripeness, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded quite sensibly that removal constituted a 
waiver of any such ripeness defense the town may once have had.75  
At the same time, in Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko,76 it was the 
property owner who removed the case to federal court.77  Nonethe-
less, the Fourth Circuit held that Williamson County’s rule was pru-
dential, giving courts the discretion to litigate or not.78  In this case, 
the court held that federal litigation was appropriate and ordered the 
district court to consider it.79  In a recent en banc decision, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the rule was prudential and decided the mer-
its.80  Thus, although the property owner lost, it was on the merits, not 
because of the game of jurisdiction guessing.81 
B. Substantively, the Court Seems to be Gaining 
Understanding of Land Use 
One of the problems in the Supreme Court’s development of 
 
72 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346. 
73 724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013). 
74 Id. at 538. 
75 Id. at 545-46. 
76 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013). 
77 Id. at 394. 
78 Id. at 399. 
79 Id. 
80 Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
81 Id. 
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rules for litigating regulatory taking cases has seemed to be the 
Court’s general lack of understanding of how the land use process ac-
tually works.  No disrespect is intended; it is simply that the Justices 
have had little or no exposure to this field of the law and their re-
search attorneys likewise.  How else can you explain Williamson 
County’s bland suggestion that the “variance” concept—a specific 
tool designed to deal with minor size and space adjustments—be used 
to reconfigure an entire (and quite large) subdivision?82  Or MacDon-
ald’s suggestion that a property owner’s application to develop his 
land in precisely the way that the city’s general plan and zoning ordi-
nance said that he could was somehow “exceedingly grandiose?”83 
The arc of the Court’s education and understanding of the 
process has proceeded from 1978 until now in a generally positive 
way.  The current state of that understanding may be seen in the three 
decisions dealing with property rights decided from late 2012 through 
mid-2013.84
 
The first case was actually a physical invasion case, but the 
Court took the opportunity to (1) eliminate a foolish rule that had de-
veloped regarding compensation for temporary takings and (2) ex-
pressly distance itself from a “Chicken Little” argument that govern-
ment agencies routinely make in all taking cases, particularly 
regulatory taking cases.85  The case was Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States.86  The issue was whether the old federal 
flooding rule, that flooding cannot be a taking unless it is absolutely, 
positively, and irrevocably permanent, is still valid.87  The Federal 
Circuit held it was valid and reversed a judgment for compensation, 
holding that the situation “at most created tort liability.”88 
The property taken was bottomland timber.  The taking was 
done by six consecutive years of flooding (protested by the owner) 
during the growing season.  The classic federal rule was that flooding 
is not a taking if it is not permanent, no matter how many times it 
 
82 Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 188. 
83 MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 353 n.9. 
84 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586; Horne, 133 S. Ct. 2053; Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n, 133 S. 
Ct. 511; see also Lozman, 133 S. Ct. 735 (dealing with admiralty jurisdiction that I view as a 
taking case, however, because it involves seizure and destruction of a floating home). 
85 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519. 
86 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012). 
87 Id. at 515. 
88  Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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happens temporarily.  It was akin to the tort concept that every dog is 
entitled to one “free bite” before its owner can be held liable for 
damages.  Not sure if that makes sense with dogs; it never made 
sense to me for flood control projects. 
Moreover, the law has changed.  After First English, where 
the Court held that the Fifth Amendment protects against temporary, 
as well as permanent, takings,89 this issue should have been closed.  
Since then, the Federal Circuit dealt with the concept of “perma-
nence” (albeit in a non-flooding context) and concluded, if the action 
happens for as long as the government wants it to, it is permanent — 
even though the government may stop at any time.90  Furthermore, 
that same court held the destruction of timber (which apparently hap-
pened six times in this case) required compensation.91 
Below, the Claims Court determined that the flooding was 
both substantial and predictable, and awarded $5.7 million in damag-
es for lost trees and reclamation costs.  The Federal Circuit re-
versed.92  Acknowledging the temporary taking rule of First English, 
the Circuit decided to ignore it because “cases involving flooding and 
flow-age easements are different.”93 
The Supreme Court held these cases are not different and 
therefore reversed.94  That resolved one problem: the idea that some 
kinds of takings could be immunized if they did not happen frequent-
ly enough, a positive development.95 
But perhaps the highlight of the opinion was the Court’s re-
sponse to the Feds’ argument that imposing liability “would unduly 
impede the government’s ability to act in the public interest.”96  That 
canard has been raised in numerous taking cases — particularly regu-
latory cases — with numerous governmental amici (from agencies at 
levels ranging from the United States Solicitor General to local mos-
quito abatement districts).  The answer: “[t]ime and again in Takings 
 
89 First English, 482 U.S. at 318-19. 
90 Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
91 Cooper v. United States, 827 F.2d 762, 763-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
92 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 637 F.3d at 1379. 
93 Id. at 1374 (relying on pre-First English decisions). 
94 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 519, 523. 
95 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(demonstrating that on remand, the Federal Circuit got the message and ruled in favor of the 
property owner). 
96 Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 521. 
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Clause cases” the government has raised this issue; “[t]he sky did not 
fall” after the argument was rejected before.97 
This decision was unanimous. 
Next, the Court dealt with administrative overreaching by the 
Department of Agriculture.98  Everyone knows those dancing Cali-
fornia raisins.  What you may not know is (1) almost all American 
raisins come from California, and (2) the Feds have a Depression-era 
scheme to prop up raisin prices by requiring all raisin handlers to do-
nate a substantial portion of their product to the Feds for use in 
school lunch programs, etc.99  There is supposed to be some payment 
for those raisins, but not enough to satisfy all the raisin folks.  Mr. 
and Mrs. Horne got tired of it and refused to comply.100  They tired of 
the game in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004, when the Feds required them 
to “donate” 47% and 30% of their crop to the “reserve” pool, for 
which they would not be paid.101  They voiced their position to the 
Secretary of Agriculture: 
[W]e are growers that will pack and market our rai-
sins.  We reserve our rights under the Constitution of 
the United States . . .  [T]he Marketing Order Regulat-
ing Raisins has become a tool for grower bankruptcy, 
poverty, and involuntary servitude.
[102]  The Marketing 
Order Regulating Raisins is a complete failure for 
growers, handlers, and the USDA . . .  [W]e will not 
relinquish ownership of our crop.  We put forth the 
money and effort to grow it, not the Raisin Adminis-
trative Committee.  This is America, not a communist 
state.103 
The Government then brought an enforcement action against 
them — for the value of their own raisins that they did not turn over 
($483,843.53) — plus a hefty fine ($202,600), plus interest.104  The 
 
97 Id. 
98 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2056. 
99 Id. at 2056-58 (explaining the difference between “growers” and “handlers” is so arcane 
that counsel could not always keep it straight). 
100 Id. at 2059. 
101 Id. at 2057 n.2, 2059. 
102 Apparently, this Thirteenth Amendment issue did not make it into the complaint. 
103 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2058 n.3 (alteration in original). 
104 Id. at 2059. 
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Hornes’ defense was that the Feds had taken their private property for 
public use without compensation.105  It seems that in all the years 
since this statute was enacted, no one had thought to do that.  The 
Hornes had initially argued that the Fifth Amendment violation con-
sisted of the Government’s confiscating their raisins.106  However, 
when the Government’s enforcement action was filed, that changed 
to a claim that they could not be compelled to pay fines for refusing 
to accede to an unconstitutional taking of their raisins.107 
The definitive question turned out to be whether the Hornes 
could raise the Fifth Amendment as a defense to the Federal Gov-
ernment’s action or, instead, whether they had to pay the money and 
then sue in the Court of Federal Claims to get it back.108  The Gov-
ernment’s overreaching position was the latter.109 
The District Court ruled in favor of the Government.110  The 
Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, holding that the farmers could have 
avoided the confiscatory program by simply not entering the raisin 
market.111  Because they voluntarily chose to sell their raisins, they 
accepted the consequences.  (The District Court concluded that “[t]he 
Government does not force plaintiffs to grow raisins or to market the 
raisins” and mildly called donating nearly half the crop “an admis-
sions fee or toll — admittedly a steep one — for marketing rai-
sins.”)112  After the Hornes petitioned for rehearing, the Government, 
for the first time, urged that the takings defense was not ripe because 
it should have been brought in the Court of Federal Claims.113  In an 
amended opinion, the Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the exclusive 
forum for takings claims is the Claims Court.114  Certiorari was grant-
ed to determine whether the Takings Clause could be raised as a de-
fense to enjoin a direct transfer of funds mandated by the government 
 
105 Id. 
106 Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549, 2009 WL 4895362, *5 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009). 
107 Id. at *6. 
108 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2063. 
109 Id. at 2061. 
110 Id. at 2059. 
111 Id. at 2060. 
112 Id. 
113 Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012). 
114 Id. at 1080. 
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and whether the federal district court would have jurisdiction.115 
In its decision, the Court distinguished Williamson County in 
ways that may prove useful in other takings cases.116  (1) The Hornes 
plainly satisfied the requirement of obtaining a “final decision” from 
the agency: the agency imposed concrete fines.117  The ease with 
which the Court reached this conclusion was interesting, as four Jus-
tices had concluded in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel118 that a mere 
monetary demand (there, the funding of health benefits for the fami-
lies of former coal miners) should not activate the Takings Clause.119  
(2) The possibility of using alternative judicial procedures (state 
courts in Williamson County and the CFC here) was not a barrier, as 
the raisin marketing statute preempted the CFC.120 
What may elevate this opinion above the realm of raisin mar-
keting orders is the Court’s general conclusion that the regulated enti-
ty did not have to first pay the fine before being allowed to challenge 
it in court.121  The ability to demand payment — here, some $700,000 
— as a condition to entry into a federal courthouse gives the Gov-
ernment a giant leg up.  How many people are able to pay that price 
of admission?  As the Court put it, however: 
In the case of an administrative enforcement proceed-
ing, when a party raises a constitutional defense to an 
assessed fine, it would make little sense to require the 
party to pay the fine in one proceeding and then turn 
around and sue for recovery of that same money in 
another proceeding.122 
More than just raisin growers face this kind of hurdle. 
This decision was also unanimous. 
Just before it recessed for the summer, the Court decided what 
may have been the most important of the decisions, Koontz.123  We all 
know Nollan and Dolan, and their rules about confiscatory conditions 
 
115 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2060-61. 
116 Id. at 2061-62. 
117 Id. 
118 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
119 Id. at 503-04, 521. 
120 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2062-63. 
121 Id. at 2063. 
122 Id. 
123 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586. 
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placed on the issuance of land use permits.124  But what if the regula-
tor proposes conditions and the owner rejects them and the permit is 
then denied?  Do the Nollan/Dolan rules apply?  Does it matter that 
the proposed conditions would have required work or money to be 
spent on irrelevant and distant land? 
The trial court found a taking.125  The District then changed its 
mind and issued the permits.126  Compensation of some $376,000 was 
awarded for a temporary taking.127  The Florida District Court af-
firmed,128 but the Florida Supreme Court reversed.129  It held that the 
Nollan/Dolan rules do not apply (1) to money or (2) to the denial of a 
permit.130 
The United States Supreme Court reversed on both issues.131  
The vote was 5-4 but, as to the latter point, the Court was unani-
mous.132  All of the Justices recognized the word game that the gov-
ernment was playing and would have none of it.133  Indeed, probably 
the most refreshing thing about the majority opinion was several clear 
statements indicating that the Court (and, remember, this part of the 
opinion was unanimous) seemed to finally understand what actually 
occurs during municipal land use permit hearings: Four times — 
count ‘em, four (five, if you count the one quote from Nollan) — the 
Court used the word “extortionate” to describe the imposition of con-
ditions.134  Elsewhere, the Court also seemed to grasp the unfair at-
tempts that municipalities make to leverage their power: 
[L]and use permit applicants are especially vulnerable 
to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine prohibits because the government often 
has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far 
 
124 See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). 
125 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
126 St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(Griffin, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. 
128 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 2593-94. 
131 Id. at 2603. 
132 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
133 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2603. 
134 Id. at 2595-97, 2603 (majority opinion). 
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more than [the] property it would like to take. . . .  So 
long as the building permit is more valuable than any 
just compensation the owner could hope to receive for 
the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to the 
government’s demand, no matter how unreasonable.135 
If there were nothing more, this would have been significant 
progress.  But there is, of course, more. 
The facts were not unusual.  Koontz owned a bit less than fif-
teen acres of land and wanted to develop 3.7 acres.136  As it was 
largely wetlands (it was in Florida, after all), he offered to place a 
conservation easement over the remainder of the property.137  The 
agency wanted more.138  It offered Koontz two options: (1) he could 
reduce his project to one acre and put the easement over all the re-
maining property; or (2) he could pay for work done on agency prop-
erty located several miles away and having nothing to do with his 
proposed project.139  Koontz declined, and the agency denied the 
permit.140 
When the dust settled in Florida, the state Supreme Court had 
issued an opinion that would have hamstrung takings litigation in 
general and exaction litigation in particular. 
The United States Supreme Court split down traditional ideo-
logical lines, with Justice Alito writing for the majority and Justice 
Kagan for the dissenters.141  The majority made quick work of Flori-
da’s “maneuver [that] effectively interred” Nollan and Dolan.142  As 
noted, even the dissenters agreed on this point: whether the condi-
tions are attached before the permit is issued, or held over the devel-
oper’s head until afterward, makes no difference.143  Conditions, 
whether precedent or subsequent, are treated the same for this pur-
pose. 
The upshot of these recent decisions is that the Supreme Court 
 
135 Id. at 2594-95. 
136 Id. at 2591-92. 
137 Id. at 2592-93. 
138 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2591, 2603. 
142 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2591. 
143 Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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seems finally to be gaining an understanding of how the land use pro-
cess works, how regulators have been using their position to leverage 
their bargaining strength, and how a number of time-honored gov-
ernment arguments can no longer be credited. 
That brings us full circle.  If, as I strongly suspect, much of 
the ripeness problem came about because the Supreme Court simply 
did not understand the land use system and took the government’s 
word for how it operates, then the last several decades of hearing  
these cases has provided an eye-opening education.  Armed with 
knowledge, the Supreme Court is now in a position to tackle William-
son County head on and bring some sanity to this legal field. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The Supreme Court has some work to do.  Although it is nice 
to see that some circuit courts now recognize that Williamson County 
established merely a prudential rule, other circuits insist that such 
prudence be exercised in favor of yielding jurisdiction to state courts 
and keeping their federal hands off these cases.144  That leads to a 
mishmash of law, applying what should be a uniform standard of 
conduct under the federal constitution.  Until the Supreme Court 
steps in, there will be no uniformity. 
The rest of us, of course, will never know why the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in the growing number of petitions that have 
raised the Williamson County issue.  It is unfortunate that two of the 
four Justices openly skeptical of Williamson County in the San Remo 
litigation are no longer on the Court.  It may be that the remaining 
two Justices have not been able to garner sufficient support among 
the newer members of the Court to take another case.  That would be 
a shame. 
In the end, the procedural mess that exists in regulatory taking 
cases can wholly be laid at the doorstep of the Supreme Court.  If you 
go back and read the Circuit Court opinion in Williamson County, 
you will find a perfectly rational determination of a regulatory taking 
case that was tried on its merits and fully adjudicated.  For some rea-
son, the Supreme Court decided to place some restrictions on bring-
ing such cases in federal court.  As the concurring San Remo Justices 
observed, however, there had developed a catalogue of shortcomings 
 
144 Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545; Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1117. 
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noted by lower courts and legal commentators, challenging the core 
Williamson County precept that the Constitution somehow requires 
state court litigation.145  That, said the four Justices, is “not clear,” 
“not obvious,” and “[not] support[ed]” by the cases relied on there.146 
But, there is only one court that can clean up this mess, and 
that is the Supreme Court.  I have always been an optimist (one can-
not represent property owners in this field without being an optimist), 
but I have not been able to get the Court’s attention either with the ar-
ticles noted in the early footnote, or with petitions for certiorari ask-
ing for rational resolution of this package of issues. 
I will continue to be an optimist.  The fact that the Court 
could actually deal with the merits of multiple takings cases in its 
most recent Term gives me hope that it can finally cut through the 
mare’s nest that ripeness has become.  Stay tuned.  This ain’t over 
yet. 
 
145 San Remo, 545 U.S. at 349-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
146 Id. at 349 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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